RECENT CASES.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-PuRcHASE OF OUTSTANDING TImE-One claiming
title to lands by adverse possession under color of title entered under a deed
from a stranger to the title, but before the period for perfecting his title had
run, purchased a one-half undivided interest in the lands from one who
claimed to be a tenant in common. Held: The purchase of the outstanding
title did not break the continuity and adverse nature of the holding under
the first title. Paper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 84 S. E. Rep.
523 (N. C. 1915).
The practically universal result of the decisions is that the purchase of
an outstanding title by an adverse holder does not necessarily interrupt the
continuity of the possession nor prevent it from being longer adverse.
Whether it does or does not affect the adverse possession, depends entirely
upon the circumstances of each case. Generally, if the possession began
under a claim of title in fee, the purchase of another title is not regarded
as an interruption of the former possession. Elder v. McCaskey, 70 Fed.
Rep. 529 (x895); Ripley v. Miller, 13o N. W. Rep. 345 (Mich. I9ix). Nor is
an offer by an adverse holder to purchase the claim of another sufficient to
break the continuity of the running of limitation. Montgomery Lumber Co.
v. Quimby, 128 Pac. Rep. 402 (Cal. 1913). The principle of the rule is that
the person in possession of property under a claim of complete ownership
has the right to fortify his title, quiet his possession, and protect himself
from litigation by the buying of any real or pretended titles, without thereby
recognizing the validity of such titles, or holding possession in subordination
to them. Cannon v. Stockmon, 36 Cal. 535 (1869); Mather v. Walsh, io7
Mo. 121 (i8gi). There is, however, at least one case which lays down the
broad general rule that the purchase of an outstanding title by an adverse
holder must be regarded as an abandonment of whatever possessory title he
had and as a holding under the new deed. Croan v. Joyce, 3 Bush. 454
(Ky. 1867) ; but see Bryant v. Prewitt, 117 S. W. Rep. 343 (Ky. 199o).
There have also been numerous cases in which the continuity of possession has been interrupted by the purchase of an outstanding claim, because
exceptional circumstances showed that the adverse possessor intended to
abandon his prior possession and claim under his newly acquired title. Jackson v. Sears, io Johns. 435 (N. Y. 1813); Liggett v. Morgan, 98 Mo. 39

(1888).
OF PRINCIPAL FOR OVER-OFFICIOUS SERVANT-A young
AGENC -LIABILITY
man was employed by defendant solely for the purpose of marking goods.
He, in excess of his authority, followed customers from the store, charged
them with larceny and caused their arrest. Held: In the absence of ratification, the proprietor was not liable for his employee's acts. Rigby v. HerzfeldPhillipson Co., 151 N. W. Rep. 26o (Wis. 1915).
Undoubtedly the principal may be liable for the act of his agent in an
action of false imprisonment, but the act of the agent becomes that of the
principal only when expressly authorized, Pinkerton v. Martin, 82 Ill. App.
89 (i889) ; or when his authority to act may fairly be inferred from the
nature and scope of the employment. The authority may be implied when
the arrest is made by the agent in the absence of the principal for the protection of property that is in danger, and in some cases it has been inferred
when the arrest was to recover the property back, or where the crime was at
the time being perpetrated. Markley v. Snow, 56 Atl. Rep. 9W9 (Pa. 19o4);
Field v. Kane, 99 Ill. App. I (igox). Thus the proprietor was held liable for
the acts of his watchman and floor-walker in arresting a customer suspected
of stealing. Efroymson v. Smith, 63 N. E. Rep. 328 (Ind. x902). Likewise
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defendant railroad was not liable for the action of a porter who had temporary charge of its yard in arresting a teamster whom he suspected of
stealing. Edwards v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 445 (1870).
But see contra, Bernheimer Bros. v. Becker, io2 Md. 250 (I9O5). There is a
distinction between acts done for the purpose of protecting property by preventing a felony or of recovering it back, and acts done for the purpose of
punishing the offender for what has already been done. There is no implied
authority in a person having the custody of property to take such steps as
he thinks fit to punish a person whom he supposeg to have done something
in reference to the property. Allen v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B.
65 (187o).
BILLS AND NOTEs-UsURY-A note void in its inception for usury con-

tinues void forever, even in the hands of a holder in due course. The Negotiable Instruments Law, §57, has not altered the established law on this point.
Sabine v. Paine et al., I51 N. Y. Supp. 735 (1915). The defense of usury
(under the above section of the Negotiable Instruments Law) is only an
equity, and cannot be urged against a holder in due course. Ernst Oser &
Co. v. Behrend, I5I N. Y. Supp. 873 (I915).
These two contemporaneous, but conflicting, decisions of the New York
Supreme Court indicate the nebulous state of the law upon this point. It is
generally held that illegality by statute, except where the instrument is
expressly declared to be void, is merely an equity. Sondheimer v. Gilbert, 18
N. E. Rep. 687 (Ind. 1888); Bluthenthal v. Frederick, 175 Ala. 398 (1912).
It was clearly established in New York, before the Statute, that usury was an
absolute defense. Claflin v. Boorum, 122 N. Y. 385 (i8go). Since the Negotiable Instruments Law, the New York courts, in common with many others,
have expressed doubts as to whether the act has changed the former rule.
Klar v. Kostink, 119 N. Y. Supp. 683 (igog); Crusins v. Siegman, 142 N. Y.
Supp. 348 (1913). On the one hand, it is argued that since the act provides
that a holder in due course takes free from defect of title of prior parties,
the old law is repealed by necessary implication. Emanuel v. Misicki, 149
N. Y. Supp. 905 (1914). Other courts, on the other hand, maintain that if
the legislature intended to make so drastic a change, it would have done
so by express enactment. Lawson v. First Nat. Bk., io2 S. W. Rep. 324 (Ky.
i9o7).

The Court of Appeals of New York has not as yet declared the present
law on this subject. It has held, however, in Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, 189
N. Y. i (19o7), and Schlesinger v. Lehmaier, 191 N. Y. 69 (igog), that where
a bank is a holder in due course the defense of usury is unavailable as
against it. These decisions were based upon a liberal construction of the
State Banking Law on the subject of usury in connection with §57 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. It would seem that if the provision of the
Negotiable Instruments Law is at all applicable to banks, it should also apply
to individual holders in due course.
BILLS AND NoTEs-HoLDER IN DUE COURSE-BURDEN OF PRooF-The indorsee of a note which had been negotiated to him by the payee in breach of
an agreement with the maker brought suit against the maker. Held: The
holder cannot rely merely upon the presumption that he is a holder in due
course, but has the burden of proving it. Holdsworth v. Blyth & Fargo Co.,
146 Pac. Rep. 603 (Wyo. 1915).
In an action on a negotiable instrument plaintiff is presumed, in the first

instance, to be a bona fide holder. Strickland v. Henry, 66 App. Div. 23
(N. Y. i9oI). It is further presumed that he took before maturity, Walters
v. Palmer, iio Ga. 776 (I9OO),

and without notice of defenses, Pickens v.

Post, 99 Fed. Rep. 659 (19oo). The presumption holds even though the
defendant sets up the defense of want of consideration as between maker
and payee. Holden v. Phoenix Co., 47 N. E. Rep. 241 (Mass. i89"); Crosby
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v. Ritchey, 76 N. W. Rep. 895 (Neb. 1898). But, when the consideration for
a note is shown to have been illegal, the burden is cast upon the indorsee,
suing thereon to show that he is a holder in due course. Le Tourneux v.
Gilliss, 82 Pac. Rep. 27 (Cal. 19os) ; Sullivan v. Langley, 120 Mass. 437 (1876) ;
Orr v. Cotta Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 521 (1904). Fraud by payee in procuring
the note casts upon the indorsee the burden of proving payment for value.
Trust Co. v. Bank, 83 S. E. Rep. 474 (N. C. 1915); Ruper v. Gravey, S Pa.
Super. Ct. 316 (1897). The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that he is a
bona fide purchaser where the defendant proves that the note was put in circulation by fraud, Bank v. Avant, 66 So. Rep. 509 (Ala. I915); Regester v.
Reed, 183 Mass. 226 (19o4); Bank v. Furman, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 415 (1897),
where it was held that an affidavit of defense setting out facts which would
make a case of fraudulent circulation of the note, put upon the plaintiff the
burden of proving himself a bona fide holder. Putting a note in circulation
contrary to an agreement with the maker is sufficient fraud to cause the above
doctrine to be applied. Ward v. Bank, 17o S. W. Rep. 845 (Tex. 1915).
CRIMINAL LAw-AssAuLT-ExcEssIvE SPEED OF AuTOMOBILE-The crime
of assault and battery may be committed by driving an automobile on a
public highway at a rate of speed that endangers the safety of other persons
and actually results in such an injury. The intent to injure, which is essential, may be inferred from the consequences that are naturally to be apprehended as the result of the particular act, the doing of which was intentional. State v. Schutte, 93 At. Rep. 112 (N. J. 1915).
In accordance with the principal case, it is held that intent by an automobile driver to commit an assault and battery by driving his car against
another may be inferred from circumstances legitimately permitting it, as by
intentional acts directly causing the injury done under reckless disregard of
the safety of others or the commission of an unlawful act naturally leading
to such injury. Luther v. State, 98 N. E. Rep. 640 (Ind. 1912). Mere violation of an ordinance, however, does not in itself supply the intent to another
act (assault and battery) which requires a criminal intent to be proved.
Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873). Nor will mere lack of ordinary care supply the intent. Luther v. State, supra. A verdict of guilty of
assault in operating an automobile will be sustained where the evidence shows
that the machine was run with reckless speed on the wrong side of the highway, and in such a manner that it zigzagged from side to side. Commonwealth v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 186 (1913). See 63 UNIV. OF PENNA.
LAW REV. 320 (Feb. 1915).

CRIMINAL LAw-PRosTITUTIoN-The defendant induced a girl to enter a

house of ill fame for the purpose of having personal sexual intercourse with
her. Held: That a conviction could not be sustained under the Act of June
7, 1911, P. L. 698, which provides that anyone who shall procure or entice
a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution, or to enter
"for the purpose of prostitution" any place where prostitution is practiced,
shall be guilty of pandering. "Prostitution means common, indiscriminate
sexual intercourse in distinction from sexual intercourse confined exclusively
to one individual." Commonwealth v. Lavery, 247 Pa. 139 (I915).
In accordance with the principal case, it is quite generally held that
statutes prescribing the punishment for enticing a female person to leave
her place of abode "for the purpose of prostitution" do not apply to the case
of a man enticing such woman for the sole purpose of illicit sexual intercourse with him. Comm. v. Cook, 53 Mass. 93 (1846); Iowa v. Ruhl, 8 Ia.
447 (i85g); State v. Gibson, III Mo. 92 (i89 2). The word "prostitution"
does not mean sexual intercourse with some particular man, or with one man
only, but it means to offer freely and openly to an indiscriminate, common
intercourse with men. People v. Demoussett, 77 Cal. 6i (x887); Haygood
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v. State, 98 Ala. 61 (1892). The Act of Congress known as the White Slave
Act prohibits the interstate transportation of a woman or girl "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral purpose". Act of
June 25, iIO.c. 395. 36 Stat. 82.i, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1343. Under
this act. it has been held sufficient to sustain a conviction that the accused
has caused a woman to be transported, in interstate commerce, for the sole
purpose of having sexual intercourse with her. Johnson v. U. S., 215 Fed.
Rep. 679 (1914); U. S. v. Flaspoller, 205 Fed. Rep. loo6 (0913). It would

seem that the difference in the language of the two statutes should account
for the contrariety in the decisions under them, and that the words "for the
purpose of prostitution, debauchery or any other immoral purposes" should
be broad enough to include private sexual intercourse whereas the words
"for the purpose of prostitution" should not. See 63 U. OF P. L. R. 326.
CUIMINAL

PR0CocURE-VARIANcE-An

indictment

for

grand

larceny

alleged that the accused had obtained by fraudulent representation "the sum
of $5512.50 lawful current and genuine money of the United States". The
proof showed that no money had actually been paid, but that he had received
a draft which was later converted into two drafts of $4ooo and $Iooo, and
a deposit credit in a bank for the balance. Held: There was no fatal variance.
State v. Cary, 151 N. W. Rep. 186 (Minn. 1915).

At common law, the utmost strictness of proof was exacted in criminal
cases, even to the very letter of the averment in the indictment. Rex v.
Lee, i Leach Cr. L. 416 (Eng. I786). Today, however, a distinction is made
between the material and an immaterial variance in the proof from the indictment; no variance is regarded as material unless it is of such a substantial
character as to mislead the accused in preparing his defence, or unless it
places him in a second jeopardy for the same offense. Bennett v. U. S., I94
Fed. Rep. 63o (1912). As a general rule, any averment not necessary to
describe or to constitute the offense, which therefore may be omitted without
affecting the criminality of the charge and without detriment to the indictment, will be treated as surplusage and need not be proved. Commonwealth
v. Phoenix Hotel Co., I57 Ky. i8o (914).
Where an indictment for larceny charges the taking of money, the cases
are not in accord as to what constitutes a variance. In Perry v. State, 42
Tex. Cr. Rep. 540 (i9OI), it was held that proof of larceny of national bank
notes would not support an indictment alleging larceny of "lawful money
of the United States". But see State v. Finnegean, 127 Ia. 286 (1905), contra.
In State v. Daniel, 83 S. C. 309 (igog), it was declared that proof of larceny of a note or other obligation, given for money, will not support a conviction under an indictment charging the larceny of money. But under a
similar indictment, where it was proved that the defendant had obtained a
draft or a check which he subsequently cashed, the court decided that there
was no material variance. People v. Geyer, 117 N. Y. Supp. 662 (i9O);
People v. Arnold, 127 Pac. Rep. io6o (Cal. 1912). None of these cases go
quite so far as the principal case. It is said, however, in the principal case,
"There is no suggestion that defendant was misled or prejudiced. To hold
a fatal variance under those circumstances is but another application of a
technicality, protecting no right of the accused, but tending to obstruct the
administration of justice".
DEcEDENTs' ESTATEs-EXECUTORS-STocK-A financial panic reduced the
value of stock left by the testator and six years thereafter the executors
accepted in exchange therefor stock issued in pursuance of a consolidation
plan which proved a failure. Held: In the absence of proof of negligence
or bad faith an order surcharging the executors with the value of the stock
at time of testator's death is error. Dauler's Estate, 247 Pa. 356 (i915).
It is well settled that an executor is required to use only reasonable
diligence and good faith in performing the duties of his trust, King v. Morri-
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son, I P. & W. 188 (Pa. 1829); Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts, 185 (Pa. 1837);
Skeer's Estate, 236 Pa. 404 (1912). The prudence and care ordinarily used
in one's own business is the standard. Getz's Estate, 12 Phila. 143 (1878);
Whitney v. Peddicord, 63 Ill. 249 (1872), but his acts must be judged according to the circumstances existing at the time. Hull's Estate, 8 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 8 (1898). So as a general rule it is his duty to convert personal property into available funds as soon as reasonably possible. Pulliam v. Pulliam,
io Fed. Rep. 53 (r88i); In re Gray, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883), and in some
states this must ordinarily be done within a year, Merkel's Estate, 131 Pa.
584 (18o). The proper method is by public auction, Burnap v. Dennis, 4
111. 478 (I84a), though this is usually discretionary, Johnson v. Kay, 8 Humph.
42 (Tenn. I84 ), except where required by statute, Weyer v. Bank, 57 Ind.
198 (1877). So where an executor acts in good faith in delaying a sale,
he is not chargeable with loss occasioned thereby unless grossly negligent.
Stewart's Appeal, 0IOPa. 410 (1885); Matter of Hasford, 27 App. Div. 427
(N. Y. 8g8) ; Donnelly's Estate, 8 Pa. Dist. Rep. 182 (x8g9).
FRAUDULENT

CONVEYANCEs-HUSBAND

AND WiFE-A

husband, in failing

circumstances, conveyed his stock to his wife in repayment of advances made
to him by her out of her separate estate. Held: If the wife had knowledgeof an intent upon the part of the husband to defraud his creditors, the conveyance would be set aside as fraudulent, even though the wife gave an
adequate consideration. English v. Brown, 219 Fed. Rep. 248 (i914).
A conveyance may, under certain circumstances, be made by a husband
to his wife when the husband is in failing circumstances, Jewell v. Knight,
123 U. S. 426 (1887), but the wife must have given valuable consideration,
Clark v. Chamberlain, 95 Mass. 257 (1866), and the conveyance must have
been received by her in good faith and from an honest purpose, Smith v.
Goodrich, 87 S. W. Rep. 125 (Ark. 19o5).

Defrauded creditors of the hus-

band may have the deed set aside if the wife knew of the husband's fraudulent intent, Goodrich v. Lumber Co., 150 S. W. Rep. 4o6 (Ark. 1912), or if
she knew of facts which would charge her with knowledge of such intent,
Jewell v. Kelley, 118 N. W. Rep. 987 (Mich. igo9). The mere fact that an
action is pending against the husband when he conveyed to the wife, is not
sufficient to show that she knew of his fraudulent intent, Graham v. Morgan,
35 So. Rep. 874 (Miss. i9o4). The wife of an insolvent will be presumed
to have knowledge of her husband's intent, Castro v. lilies, 22 Tex. 479
(1858); Leich v. Dee, 47 N. W. Rep. 881 (Iowa, 1891), the burden being
on the wife to show that the transaction was fair, Gray v. Collins, 139 Ga.
776 (1913). Contra: Blackwell v. O'Neal, 152 Ky. 563 (913). But it is not
-necessary that she make out a case so clear that there is no doubt that she
was a bona fide purchaser, Tripner v. Abrahams, 47 Pa. 220 (1864).
INJUNCTION-WRONGFUL USE OF NAME AND PIcTUPE-A drug company
placed the name and picture of the complainant on bottles containing a
medicinal compound without his consent. Held: An injunction will be
granted. Edison v. Continental Chemical Co., 220 Fed. Rep. 398 (1914).
In England, an injunction will not issue to prevent a druggist from selling a quack medicine under the false representations that it was prepared by
the complainant, an eminent physician, Clark v. Freeman, ii Beav. 112 (Eng.
1848). "In Clark's case an injunction might have been granted on the ground
that complainant had property in his own name." Lord Cairns in Maxwell v.
Hogg, 2 Ch. D. 307 (Eng. 1876).
The American cases on the subject are comparatively few in number and
are in conflict. An injunction will not be granted to restrain the unauthorized publication of lithographic prints of a complainant, where the only
allegation is that there is an invasion of the complainant's right of privacy.
Robertson v. Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538 (1902); Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich.
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372 (i899). Contra: Pavesich v. Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 19o (1905). A
public character cannot restrain the publication of his portrait. Corliss v.
Walker, 64 Fed. Rep. 28o (1894); nor can a public institution restrain the
unauthorized use of its name. Vassar College v. Biscuit Co., 197' Fed. Rep.
98z (1912).
An injunction will be granted to restrain the unauthorized use
of one's name by another as part of its corporate title, or in connection
with its business, even though he is not a business competitor. Edison v.
Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. E. 136 (io7). The principal case may be distinguished
from those cases in which an injunction was refused on the ground that, as
Edison's name would cause the public to believe that the drug was of some
value, it would be a fraud on the public to allow the defendant to falsely
represent that Mr. Edison was the maker of the drug. For further discussion
and citations see 61 U. oF P. L. R. 129; 62 Ibid. 656.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEFECTIVE STEPS-LIABILITY FOR INJuRY-A lease

was made of one room in a house to which access was by a flight of steps,
under the lessor's control, leading over an area. At the time of letting, one
of the upright bars in the railing at the side was missing. Through this
aperture the lessee's child, while playing on the steps, fell into the area and
was injured. Held: The lessor was not liable, as the defect in the railing
was apparent, and not in the nature of a concealed danger or trap. Dobson
v. Horsley, [915] I K. B. 634 (C. A.), following Lucy v. Bawden, [1914] 2
K. B. 318.
In both these cases Miller v. Hancock, [1893] 2 Q. B. 177 (C. A.), was
carefully distinguished; there the plaintiff was injured by the breaking of a
step apparently sound, and recovery was allowed against the lessor, Bowen,
L. J., laying it down that "the landlord should maintain the staircase, which
is essential to the enjoyment of the premises demised, and should keep it
reasonably safe for the use of the tenants, and also of those persons who
would necessarily go up and down the stairs in the ordinary course of business with the tenants". That general principle is accepted in the American
cases as well. Crane Elevator Co. v. Lippert, 63 Fed. Rep. 94 (1894) ; Looney
v. McLean, 129 Mass. 33 (i88o); Gillvon v. Reilly, 21 Vroom, 26 (N. J. 1887).
The distinction between injuries caused by defects patent and by those
unseen is pointed out in Quinn v. Perham, 151 Mass. 162 (i8go), where it
was held that a tenant could not recover for injuries received from the bad
condition of the passageway leading to her tenement, where she leased the
tenement knowing the condition of the passage. This must be considered
not a limitation of the landlord's obligation to keep a safe passageway, but
an extension of his right to let defective premises if the defects are apparent
at the time of letting. Wien v. Simpson, 2 Phila. 158 (1856).
NEW TRIAL-EXCESSivE DAMAGEs-Two plaintiffs, injured comparatively
slightly in a collision, received verdicts of $5oo and $15O respectively, upon
which judgment was rendered. The defendant appealed. Held: A new trial
will be granted on the ground of excessive damages. Goodman v. Thomas;
Goodman v. Roof, 174 S. W. Rep. 736 (Ky. 1915).

A new trial will be granted when the verdict is for so large an amount
that no jury could reasonably have given it, or where the damages given are
so excessive as to show passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption on the
part of the jury. Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8 (19o8) ; Felt v. Puget Co., 175
Fed. Rep. 477 (1909). In the very nature of things, however, where damages are given for personal injuries, the amount which will compensate the
injured person cannot be measured by strict and definite rules, and must
be left largely to the sound judgment of a jury and the trial judge. Ruck v.
Brewery Co., 148 Wis. 222 (I912). Therefore the fact that the verdict is
larger than the appellate court would have given, or that the court would
be better pleased with a smaller verdict, is not necessarily ground for hold-
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ing the verdict excessive. Lannon v. Chicago, 159 Ill. App. 595 (i9g1); Central R_ Co. v. White, 175 Ala. 6o (1911). But where it clearly appears that

a verdict is so large as to show that it is the result of prejudice or passion
on the part of the jury, or a misconception of the law, the appellate courts
will not hesitate to adjudge such a verdict excessive. Missouri R. Co. v. Lee,
11g S. W. Rep. 144 (Tex. igog); Weiss v. R. Co., iig Minn. 355 (1912).
Where there have been several trials, a large discrepancy between the amount
of the verdicts, or a substantial uniformity, is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the verdict is excessive or otherwise. Central R. Co. v. White, supra; Ritter Co. v. Jordan, 138 Ky. 522 (gio).
But
the fact that several verdicts for the same general amount have been rendered is not necessarily controlling, if the verdict is clearly excessive.
Partello v. R. Co., 246 Mo. 122 (1912).
In some cases where an excessive verdict has been rendered, the court
will, instead of simply ordering a new trial, give the plaintiff the option of
reducing the verdict to the sum which the court considers reasonable, and
on his remitting the excess will deny the motion for a new trial. Canfield
v. R. Co., 142 Ia. 658 (igo9) ; Francis v. Brock, 8o Kan. Ioo (igog). But the
general rule, though there is authority to the contrary, is that where the
excessive verdict is due to passion or prejudice, the error cannot be cured by
a reinittitur,but the defendant is entitled to a new trial as a matter of right
Tunnel Co. v. Cooper, 50 Colo. 390 (1911); Belt R. Co. v. Charters, 123 Ill.
App. 322 (19o).
Contra: Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72 (igio). The
mere fact that a verdict in an action for unliquidated damages is very excessive does not necessarily show that it was the result of passion or prejudice,
so as to deprive the court of the power, with the consent of the plaintiff,
to correct the error by directing a rernttitur. Kerling v. Van Dusen, 113
Minn. 501 (I911) ; Clifton v. R. Co., 232 Mo. 7o8 (911).
NEW TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL-ArLuSiON To INsuRANcE-In an
action for the death of an employee in which the sole issue was the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's counsel asked a juror upon his voir dire
examination if he knew the defendant's counsel "who represent the Ocean
Insurance Co. in this case". Held: The conduct of counsel for the plaintiff,
although not ethical and very reprehensible, was not ground for reversal as
the evidence was such that in all probability, the same verdict would have
been returned by the jury in the absence of such misconduct. Parkdale Fuel
Co. v. Tyler, 144 Pac. Rep. 138 (Colo. 1914).
It is well settled that a jury, in a suit by an employee against his
employer for personal injuries, will not be allowed to take into consideration the fact that the employer is insured against accidents to his employees.
Sawyer v. Arnold Shoe Co., 9o Me. 369 (1897). Hence, the plaintiff's counsel
will not be allowed to comment in his argument to the jury upon the fact
that the defendant carries such insurance. Tremblay v. Harden, 162 Mass.
383 (1894) ; Hollis v. U. S. Glass Co., 220 Pa. 19 (igo8). And if such remarks

are made, a judgment for the plaintiff will be set aside notwithstanding an
instruction by the trial judge that the remarks should not be considered for
any purpose. Coe v. Van Why, 33 Colo. 315 (i9o5). But see contra, where
instruction to disregard the remarks is given, Anderson v. Duckworth, 162
Mass. 251 (I894). However, it has been held that the attorney for the
plaintiff may in his examination of jurors on their voir dire ask them if
they are in any way connected with an accident insurance company or have
any interest therein, provided always that this is done in good faith without
any intent to call the attention of the jury to the fact of the insurance
unnecessarily or for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant's rights. Viou
v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97 (19o6). Such questions are for
the purpose of eliciting information from, and not imparting it to the jury.
Brusseau v. Lower Buck Co., iO N. W. Rep. 577 (Ia. 19o); Iverson v.
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McDonald, 36 Wash. 73 (i9o4). In accord with the principal case, where it
appears from the evidence that the defendant was not prejudiced by the reference to the insurance, it is not cause for reversal. Tanner v. Harper, 32 Colo.
is6 (19o4).
NEw TRAL-SEPARATION

OF

ISSUES-Order XXXIX, Rule 7, of the

English Rules of the Supreme Court, is: "A new trial may be ordered on
any question without interfering with the finding or decision upon any other
question." In an action for breach of promise of marriage, after verdict and
judgment against him, the defendant discovered evidence tending to prove
the plaintiff was married to someone else, and he applied for a new trial. A
new trial was granted, upon the one question: whether the plaintiff was previously married or not, Buckley, L. J. (now Lord Wrenbury), saying "the
defendant ought not to have a new trial on the question whether or not there
was a promise to marry or as to the amount of damages". Robinson v. Smith,
[1915] I K. B. 711.
This rule is frequently applied even in cases of this sort, where only one
claim is made in the action, although it was originally meant as a complement
to the increased facilities under the Judicature Acts for joinder of causes
of action. In Marsh v. Isaacs, 45 L. J., C. P., 505 (1876), the plaintiff brought
one action in respect of four separate claims against the same defendant;
the jury found for the plaintiff upon two claims, for the defendant upon a
third, and disagreed as to the fourth. Lindley, J., entered judgment upon
the first three claims and discharged the jury as to the fourth. A general
new trial was moved for, and it was held (under Order XXXIX, Rule 4, of
1875, corresponding to the above) that judgment was properly entered upon
the first three issues, but that the parties might have a new trial upon the
issue as to which the jury disagreed.
There are not many decisions reported under the rule, as its meaning
is perfectly clear. In two cases the court refused to apply it, for cause, and
granted retrial of the whole action. Purnell v. Great Western, etc., I Q. B.
636 (1876), and Sandford v. Porter and Wane, [1912] 2 Irish R. 551.
The same rule of procedure is observed in American code states generally, though apparently not in New York. Colwell Lead Co. v. Construction
Co., 156 App. Div. 824 (913). In Massachusetts the Supreme Judicial Court
early developed a similar practice without legislation on the subject. Winn
v. Columbian Insurance Co., 29 Mass. 278 (12 Pick., 1831); Robbins v. Townsend, 37 Mass. 345 (20 Pick. 1838); Hubbell v. Bissell, 84 Mass. j96
(2 Allen, 1861).
PLEADING-MISSPELLING-In Yeater v. Jennings Oil Co., 84 S. E. Rep. 904
(W. Va. i915), it was contended, without success, that the declaration was
demurrable because the word "gauge" was spelled "guage". We are carried
back to the middle ages when "faux latine" was a serious, sometimes fatal
error. See "mumdare" for "mundare", 2 Hen. 4, 8 0401); "Johanni" for
"Johannem", 2 Hen. 4, 8 (40) ; "hac breve" for "hoc breve", 9 Hen. 7, i6
(1494), and other cases in Brookes Abridgement, 333. Such niceties may
delight the pleader in criminal procedure, but on the civil side, taking into
consideration the limitations of the modern typist, one cannot but feel relieved
that the West Virginia case went as it did.
PROCEDURE-PARTIES-ALiEN ENEMY-Two women both claimed to be the
wife of Prince Victor of Thurn and Taxis. One sought to restrain the
alleged libels of the other. It was coniended that the plaintiff, being an
Hungarian, was an alien enemy and consequently not entitled to sue in the
English courts during the continuance of the war. Held: Having complied
with the requirements of the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, she came under
the protection of the British government and had the right to sue. Princess

of Thurn and Taxis,

112

L. T. Rep. 114 (Eng. 19r4).
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It is well established that during any war, foreign or civil, no action can
be maintained by, or in favor of, an alien enemy residing in the enemy's
territory. Russell v. Skipwith, 6 Binney, 241 (Pa. 1814); Haymond v. Camden, 22 W. Va. i8o (1883). This rule is grounded upon the theory that it
would be impolitic to permit the fruits of an action at law to go to a hostile
countrr and thus furnish resources to the enemy. The test as to the alien
enemy s right to sue seems to be not whether the alien was a citizen in the
enemy's country at the opening of the war, but whether, if he prove successful in the action, the probable effect will be to place the amount recovered
within the enemy's reach. Zacharie v. Godfrey, So Ill. i86 (1869). However,
when war occurred after judgment had been obtained by an alien and while
a writ of error was pending, the judgment was affirmed. Owens v. Hannay,
13 U. S. Rep. i8o (I815). If the action be upon a contract expressly sanctioned by the government, it may be maintained, though the reason for the
rule is as applicable in this case as in any other. The William Penn, i
Peters, io6 (U. S. C. C. i815). The right to sue is only suspended during
the war, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Buckner, 8 Bush. 277 (Ky. 187); Bell
v. Chapman, io Johns. 183 (N. Y. 1813); and the statute of limitations is
prevented from running. Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454 (U. S. i8o6).
In accord with the decision of the principal case, it is well settled that
an alien enemy residing in the country under a license express or implied
may sue. Hall's International Law, page 388; Otteridge v. Thompson, 2
Cranch, io8 (U. S. C. C. 1814); Janson v. Dreifontein Consolidated Mines,
87 L. T. Rep. 372 (Eng. I9O2). "A lawful residence implies protection and
a capacity to sue and be sued. A contrary doctrine would be repugnant to
sound policy, no less than to justice and humanity." Chancellor Kent in
Clark v. Morey, io Johns. 69 (N. Y. 1813).
PROCEDURE-WIT OF PROHIBITION-IssUANCE-Upon complaint a magistrate issued an attachment without first requiring an attachment bond to be
executed and filed as required by law. A motion to have the attachment
discharged on that account was overruled by the magistrate, whereupon Supreme Court was asked for a writ of prohibition to prevent the magistrate
from proceeding further in the case. Held: There is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law by appeal; hence the writ will not issue. Pendley v.
Allen, r45 Pac. Rep. 1157 (Okl. i915).
This decision is in accord with the general rule on the subject. The writ
of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing to a court from
another court having supervision and control of its proceedings to prevent it
from proceeding further in a matter pending before such lower court. 1g
Am. & Eng. Enc. 263, 264. It will never lie where a court having jurisdiction of the parties makes an erroneous application of the law remediable by
appeal. Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Bartlesville, 27 Oki.
214 (I91O). In cases where the court below is acting beyond its jurisdiction
it will be granted only where there is no other adequate remedy. Alexander
v. Orollott. igg U. S. s8o (i9o5). It is an appropriate remedy pending an
appeal from an inferior to a superior court to prevent the former from
exceeding its jurisdiction by attempting to execute the judgment appealed
from, Supervisors v. Gorrell, 2o Grat. 484 (Va. i8ii) ; to prevent an inferior
court from interfering with or attempting to control the records and seal of a
superior court by injunction, Thomas v. Meade, 36 Mo. 232 (865) ; to prevent
justices of the peace from proceeding without authority of law to abate a
supposed nuisance, Zylstra v. Charleston, I Bay, 382 (S. Ca. 1794); to prevent a probate court exercising its jurisdiction over the estate of a deceased
person when it cannot lawfully do so. U. S. v. Shanks, 15 Minn. 369 (870).
The writ of prohibition is however a purely prerogative writ, granted or
withheld in the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each
partidular case. State v. Whitaker, 114 N. Ca. 818 (1894). Prohibition will
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not issue for ministerial but only for judicial acts. State v. Whitaker, supra.
The unlawful act must also be the act of a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
The writ does not lie against private individuals. Southern R. Co. v. Birmingham S. & N. R. Co., 131 Ala. 663 (igoI); Moore v. Holt, 55 W. Va. 507
(1904).
PROPERTY-GIFTS--CmMUNiTY PROPERTY OF HUSBAND AND WIF-A husband gave certain stock certificates and promissory notes to his wife. Some
were endorsed and assigned to her, others were not. They were all delivered
over to her, and kept in her exclusive possession. Held: To overcome the
presumption of community of property, the evidence must be clear and convincing that the stock and notes were the wife's own individual property.
Possession of the assigned certificates was such evidence; possession of the
unassigned certificates was not sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
In re Slocum's Estate, 145 Pac. Rep. 2o4 (Wash. 1915).
In a few jurisdictions where the influence of the civil law is strongly
felt, no rights of dower or courtesy exist, but all property acquired during
the marriage relation, whether title thereto be taken in the name of the
husband, of the wife, or in their joint names, is presumed to be community
roperty. In re Boody, 113 Cal. 682 (1896); Fortier v. Barry, iii La. 776
(1904); Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev. 364 (I883); Strong v. Eakin, 66 Pac. Rep.
539 (N. Mex. x9O) ; Clark v. Thayer, 98 Tex. 142 (19o4). The burden rests
with the parties claiming the separate character of the property. The presumption as to the community character of the property may be overthrown
only by evidence of a clear, certain and convincing character. Fennell v.
Drinkhouse, 131 Cal. 447. In cases of gifts inter zivos the possession of a
note, bond or deed by an indorsee or assignee will be considered as raising a
presumption of delivery. Castor v. Peterson, 2 Wash. 204 (I89r). It is
otherwise with the unassigned certificates and promissory notes, because
a mere passage of the naked possession of notes to other than the payee or
grantee and of certificates of stock to one to whom they have not been
assigned or endorsed does not meet the requirements of a good delivery.

Sharmer v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 509 (1895); Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J.

28 (Md. i83o); Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455 (I89).

SALEs-RIGHTS OF BONA FIDE PURCHASERs-Lumber was sold and delivered to the buyer under an agreement that payment of purchase price should
be made on delivery of goods. Subsequently, no payment being made, the
buyer sold the lumber to a bona fide purchaser. Held: As between a bona
fide purchaser and the original seller title is in the seller, unless he is guilty
of laches. Orillia Lumber Co. v. Chicago. M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 146 Pac. Rep.

85o (Wash. 1915).

The majority view is that, when goods are sold upon condition that the
price therefor shall be paid upon receipt of the goods, the title remains in
the seller until the goods are paid for, Mclver v. Frazier Co., 92 Pac. Rep.
17o (I904), and a subsequent purchaser from the buyer cannot obtain a title
good as against the original seller, Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 121 Ala. 94 (i899) ;
Steel Co. v. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500 (f905), unless the seller has been guilty
of laches. Leatherbury v. Connor, 54 N. J. L. 172 (1892); Townsend v. Melvin, 63 Atl. Rep. 330 (Del. i9o5). Not reclaiming goods within a reasonable
time after default is such laches as will prevent vendor from setting up his
title as against a bona fide purchaser from the buyer, Townsend v. Melvin,
supra; but it is not necessary that the seller act immediately upon learning
of the wrongful resale, Bennett v. Tam, 24 Mont. 457 (190oo).
The minority view is that, although a delivery 'conditioned upon payment
of the purchase price as a condition precedent to passing of title will operate
to prevent title passing, as between immediate parties to the contract, until
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the performance of the condition, Lee v. Galbraith, 5 La. Ann. 343 (185o),
yet as to a bona fide purchaser from the buyer the original seller is without
recourse. Ry. Co. v. Kerr, 49 Ill. 458 (1868) ; Lears v. Shroub, 24 Ind. App.
313 (1898). But this doctrine will not be enforced in favor of a subsequent
purchaser where he has notice of the defect in the title of the original buyer,
Garbutt v. Bank, 22 Wis. 384 (1867), or where the facts are such as to charge
him with such notice. Bank v. McCrea, io6 Ill. 281 (1883).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT NOT TO ALTER WILL-A contract was
entered into whereby one party agreed that his will, which was already made
with a provision in favor of the other party, should remain unchanged. The
promisor subsequently devised the property to another person. Held: Equity
will fasten a trust on the property in the hands of the devisee, and will decree
that he make a conveyance to the promisee in accordance with the terms of

the contract. White v. Winchester, 92 Atl. Rep. 1057 (Md. 1915).

A contract to make a certain disposition of property by last will, or not
to revoke a will already made, cannot be specifically enforced by a decree
compelling the promisor to make the will, in the one case, nor by an injunction preventing the revocation, in the other. Bourget v. Monroe, 58 Mich. 563
(1885); Turnispeed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 578 (1899). But the same result is
reached by requiring those who acquire the legal title to convey the property
in accordance with the terms of the promisor's agreement. Cassey v. Fitton,
2 Harg. Jur. Arg. 296 (Eng. 1679); Winne v. Winne, 166 N. Y. 263 (igol).
Where the promisor, in breach of his contract to devise certain property, has
conveyed it to another by act inter vivos, the promisee may obtain relief
from the grantee, either after the promisee's death, Whiton v. Whiton, 179
Ill. 32 (18g9); or before the promisor's death, in which case the grantee is
directed to hold the land for the promisor during the remainder of his life,
and at his death to convey to the promisee. Duvale v. Duvale, 56 N. J. Eq.
375 (1897). A valid contract to bequeath personalty is enforceable against
the estate. Thompson v. Stevens, 7"t Pa. 169 (1872); Harper's Estate, 196
Pa. 137 (19oo).

There is a want of harmony among the decisions in regard to the enforcement of parol contracts to devise land, with reference to the scope and
applicability of the Statute of Frauds. Dicken v. McKinley, 163 Ill. 318
(x896); Synge v. Synge, L R. I Q. B. 466 (Eng. 1894). When the beneficiary of the contract to make a will is not a party to the agreement equity
will not enforce the contract in favor of one from whom no consideration
moved to either of the parties of the agreement. Wait v. Wilson, 86 App.
Div. 485 (N. Y. i93); Phalen v. U. S. Trust Co. of N. Y., I86 N. Y. 178
(igo6).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-REAL ESTATE-DOUBTFUL TITLE-A contract to
purchase land was conditioned that the land should not be subject to restrictive covenants prohibiting apartment houses. It was later discovered that the
land was encumbered by a restrictive covenant prohibiting the erection of
buildings other than "dwelling houses." Held: "As dwelling houses" includes
"apartment houses", specific performance is granted against the vendee.
Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Madison Avenue Building Co., io8
N. E. Rep. 444 (N. Y. 1915).
The principal case seems to have gone very far in forcing a title upon a
vendee, and can hardly be brought within the rules as laid down in the leading case of Pyrke v. Waddingham, io Hare, I (Eng. 185o). The general rule
is that equity will not force a doubtful or non-marketable title upon a vendee.
If the doubt as to the title arises upon a question of general law, specific
performance should be decreed only when the general law upon that point is
well settled. In re Thackwray, 40 Ch. Div. 34 (Eng. 1888); Matthews v.
If the doubt arises because of extrinsic cirLightner, 85 Minn. 333 (902).
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cumstances and disputed facts, specific performance is to be refused. Barger
v. Gery, 64 N. J. Eq. 263 (i902); Richmond v. Koenig, 43 Minn. 480 (I89O).
If the doubt arises upon the construction of a particular instrument, specific
performance must be refused if the court is doubtful as to its construction,
and should be refused if the doubt is so fair and reasonable that the property
would be left in the purchaser's hands not marketable. The fact that the
court's opinion is in favor of the title is -not sufficient to decree specific performance. Pyrke v. Waddingham, supra; Chesneau v. Cummings, 142 Mass.
65 (x886). "To force a title on a purchaser, the opinion of the court in favor
thereof must be so clear that it cannot be apprehended that another judge
may form a different opinion." Rogers v. Waterhouse, 4 Drew. 329 (Eng.
x8s8).
While the principal case falls squarely within the third and last proposition laid down by Pyrke v. Waddingham, it is hard to reconcile the decision
with the great majority of cases. The reasoning of the court is that, there
being no dispute as to the facts, an interpretation of the restrictive covenant
by the highest court of appeal would control the determination of subsequent
suits involving the same point. Thus the rule that a vendee is not required
to buy a lawsuit is not contradicted. Barnard v. Brown, 1i2 Mich. 452
(897). Moreover, there are a few courts which hold, in accord with the
principal case, that a court of appeal, in a case before it, will decide on the
validity of a vendor's title, and irrespective of the decree below, will direct
a conveyance or not accordingly. Kelso v. Lorillard, 85 N. Y. 177 (i88i);
Smith v. Estes, 72 Mo. 310 (i88o).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PAROL AGREEMENT-LEASE OF REALTY-A parol
agreement was made to execute a lease of certain real estate. The lease was
to be for one year, renewable for three years more. Held: The lease was to
be made in the future and, when executed would have extended over a longer
period than one year. The parol agreement to execute such a lease is within
the Statute of Frauds and unenforceable. Hanson v. Marion, 15 N. W.

Rep. 195 (Minn. 1915).

By the Statute of Frauds, oral leases to take effect in the future or
those which could not, when executed, be performed within one year, were
invalid. The rule is that since the lease itself must be in writing, the agreement to enter into such a lease must also be in writing; otherwise the purpose
of the statute would be wholly nullified and avoided in all cases. Cram v.
Thompson, 87 Minn. 172 (I9O2); Hurley v. Woodsides, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1073
(1899). The contrary doctrine is, however, held in some jurisdictions where
the distinction between the case itself and the agreement to execute the same
has been pointed out. Tillman v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 113 (1865).
A lease for
one year with the privilege of renewal for one or more years on a certain
notice is for a greater term than one year. Donovan v. Schoenhofen Brewing
Co., 92 Mo. App. 34i (I9o23.
SUNDAY-HOLDING COURT ON SUNDAY-In a murder trial, the closing
arguments of counsel were concluded at 11.30 P. M. Saturday. A recess was
taken until zi.oo A. M. Sunday when, in the presence of the attorney-general,
the defendant and his counsel, the court charged the jury, who then retired.
The verdict was returned into open court on Monday. Held: Charging the
jury is a high judicial act and under the common law, no judicial act can
be performed on Sunday. Moss v. State, 173 S. W. Rep. 859 (Tenn. 1915).
The universal rule at the early common law was that Sunday was a "dies
non juridicus" and hence it was unlawful for a court to do any judicial act
on Sunday. Coke, 2nd Inst. 264; see also Swann v. Broome, 3 Burr. x595
(Eng. 1764), in which Lord Mansfield reviews the development of the rule
from the Roman canons and constitutions, dating from 517 A. D., which made
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Sunday a non-judicial day, until its adoption by the Saxon kings as part of
the common law of England, and its application by the English courts. -The
awarding of any judicial process, the finding of an indictment, and the giving
of judgment were considered judicial acts, and void if done on Sunday.
Bedoe v. Alpe, Jones, x56 (Eng. 1628). But while judicial acts were unlawful, any ministerial act could be lawfully executed on Sunday. So an arrest,
Mackalley's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 656 (I611).
In the absence of a statute, the modern cases have followed the old common law rule. There has been a great diversity of opinion as to what is a
judicial act and what is a ministerial act. Charging the jury is generally
considered a judicial act, and void if done on Sunday. Pulling v. People, 8
Barb. 384 (N. Y. 185o). But see contra, Gholsten v. Gholsten, 3 Ga. 625
(i86o), where by inadvertence, the judge did not finish his charge until 12.10
A. M. Sunday; Johns v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 257 (1878), and State v. McGimsey,
8o N. C. 377 (1879), in which it was held that, when necessary for the speedy
rendition of a verdict or when requested by the jury, instructions may lawfully be given on Sunday, after notice to or in the presence of the parties or
their attorneys. However. receiving a verdict is merely a ministerial act and,
as such, may be done on Sunday. State v. Keatine, 13o La. 434 (1912) ; Van
Riper v. Van Riper, 4 N. J. L. IS6 (1818), as a work of necessity; but see
contra, Harper v. State, 43 Tex. 431 (1875). Rendering judgment is a judicial
act and hence void when rendered on Sunday. Blood v. Bates, 31 Vt. 147
(1858); but see contra, Taylor v. Ervin, II9 N. C. 274 (I896), where a judgment rendered at once upon a verdict received on Sunday was held good.
For a full discussion of the rules and citation of cases, see Ringgold's Law of
Sunday, page 151, et seq.
TRADE-NAMES-INFRINGEMENTS-NAMES OF CELEBRATED MEN-A firm had
used the registered trade-mark: "Listerene" for seventeen years for an antiseptic solution, when the defendant company adopted the name "Listerseptine"
for a similar product. Held: The fact that Lord Lister, an eminent surgeon,
twenty-nine years before had inaugurated the use of similar solutions resulting in the terms "lister" and "listerian" becoming familiar to the profession
is immaterial and an injunction should be granted. Lambert Pharmacal Co,
v. Kalish Co., 219 Fed. Rep. 323 (1915).
The name of one who has achieved fame and distinction may be adopted
as a trade-name, provided it is not descriptive of the quality or character of
the article. Petrolia Mfg. Co. v. Bell, etc., Soap Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 781 (1899) ;
Hesseltine, Trade-Marks and Unfair Trade, page I5. Such names are considered arbitrary and fanciful. Barrows v. Knight, 6 R. I. 434 (i86o). But
the name must not be geographical. See 62 UNIV. OF PENNA. LAW REv. 666
(1914).
As to the territorial extent of protection, see Hanover Star Milling Co.
v. Allen and Wheeler Co., 2o8 Fed. Rep. 513 (1913), and 62 UNiv. OF PENNA.
LAW REV. 581 (1914). For the distinction between the relief for infringement and that for unfair competition, see note in 62 UNiv. OF PENNA. LAW
REV. 458 (1914) and cases cited therein. See also the similar recent case of
Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chemical Corporation, 219 Fed. Rep. 325
(1915).
TROVER AND CoNVERSION-ELE ENTS-When a certain lot of land was sold,
property, stock in trade, belonging to a third person which was kept there
gratis by this landowner was advertised for sale, and by mistake a few
minor articles were sold. Held: There was no conversion of the whole
stock. Brandenburg v. Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, i51 N. W.
Rep. 134 (Minn. 1915).
This decision is in accord with the general rule that to constitute a conversion of personal property there must be some definite exercise of the right
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of complete ownership over it to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or
else some act done which destroys it or changes its character or in some way
deprives the owner of it permanently or for an indefinite length of time.
Harris v. Saunders, 2 Strobhart Eq. 370, Note (S. Ca. 1835). It has even
been held that a paper sale of goods, not followed by any sale or by any
exercise of ownership or dominion, is not a conversion. Taylor v. Horrall,
4 Blatchf. 317 (Ind. 1837). Conversion is often proved-'by a demand of possession by the owner and refusal by the person in possession to deliver. Demand and refusal are, however, merely evidence of conversion, and need not
be proved when there is other evidence of conversion in fact. Krouschnable
v. Knoblauch, 21 Minn. 56 (1874).
ToRTs-INjuRY

TO

TRESPASSING ANIMALs-A railroad company put poison

on its unfenced right of way to destroy Johnson grass growing thereon. A
statute forbade the growth of Johnson grass on railroad property, and another statute made railways that failed to fence their tracks liable for cattle
killed. Cattle came upon the unenclosed right of way and ate the poison.
Held: The railroad company is not liable for the death of the cattle. Fort
Worth & R. G. Rwy. Co. v. Brown, 173 S. W. Rep. 943 (Tex. 1914).
In a number of jurisdictions, statutes make railroad companies answerable for all damages sustained in consequence of their neglect to fence.
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Gill, 49 Kan. 441 (1892); Fremont, etc. R. Co. v.
Pounder, 36 Neb. 247 (1893).

But the fencing statutes of the great majority

of States impose liability only for injuries done to animals, and not for any
done by animals. Knight v. N. Y., Lake Erie, etc. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 25 (1885) ;
Earl v. St. Louis, etc. Rwy. Co., 84 Ark. 507 (1907).

In accord with the deci-

sion in the principal case, it has been frequently held that the company is
liable only for cattle killed by its engines, cars or agents. Bear v. Chicago,
etc. Rwy. Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 25 (i9o5); G. H. & S. A. Rwy. Co. v. Graves,

164 S. W. Rep. 413 (Tex. 1914). The company was held not to be liable
where cattle came through a defective fence and were drowned in an unenclosed well situated on the company's right of way. Hughes v. Hannibal,
etc. R. Co., 66 Mo. 325 (1877) ; and in many States there is no liability for
injuries which are the result of fright, so long as the animal is not actually
touched by any part of the train. Logan v. St. Louis, etc. Rwy. Co., III Mo.
App. 674 (19o). Contra: Meeker v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 21 Ore. 513
(1892).
Whether an owner of unenclosed lands owes any duty of care with
respect to trespassing animals, when by law they are permitted to run at
large, is a question not settled by the authorities. The landowner was not
liable when trespassing cattle drank poison left in a vat and died from its
effects. Bernhorn v. Griswold, 27 Mont. 79 (1902). But he is liable for
injuries to cattle by any artificial erection or excavation naturally calculated
to produce injury.

Hurd v. Lacy, 93 Ala. 427 (1890).

In accord with the

decision in the principal case, the modern trend of the authorities is to the
effect that a person may put poison on his premises for the protection of his
property, having due regard for the safety of human life, and he is not liable
for damages to animals that eat the poison while trespassing. Cobb v. Cater,
59 S. C. 462 (i9ol); St Louis & S. W. Rwy. Co. v. Bailey, 168 S. W. 4o6
(Tex.

1914).

TORTs-STATUTORY

LIABILITY

OF MUNICIPALITY

FOR

MOB

VIOLENCE-A

large crowd of persons confined in a city jail severely whipped and injured
another prisoner "for breaking into their home". Held: The prisoners constituted a "mob" within the meaning of the statute making cities liable for
damages resulting from mob violence. Blakeman v. City of Wichita, I44 Pac.
Rep. 816 (Kan. 1914).
A municipal corporation is not liable at common law for the conse-
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quences of its failure to protect persons and property from the violence of
mobs and riotous assemblages. Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, 375
(i86i); Hart v. Bridgeport, -3 Elatchf. 289 (U. S. C. C. 1876). However,
statutes making communities liable for depredations committed by lawless
persons have existed in England from an early period, Ratcliffe v. Eden, es
aL. 2 Cowp. 485 (Eng. 1776); Hyde v. Cogan, 2 Dougl. 699 (Eng. 1781); and
many American jurisdictions have also enacted similar statutes. Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 8i Fed. Rep. 317 (1897) ; Champaign County v. Church,
62 Ohio, 38 (igoo); Long v. City of Neenah, 107 N. W. Rep. io (Wis. x9o6).
The court in the principal case explains that the purpose of this legislation
is "to quicken the public conscience and stimulate a sentimefit in favor of law
and order by making each citizen and tajxpayrr responsblf for a proportionate
share of the loss resulting from mob violence, thus making each a champion
of peace and good order".
The manner in which these persons came together or the primary purpose for which they assemble is not material if they, in fact, become riotous
after they are brought together. i Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 28, div.
4, §3, page 514 (Ed. 1824); Solomon v. City of Kingston, 31 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
562 (x88i); City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 4j. io6 (19o2). Members
of a charivari party who forcibly placed a bride and groom in a wagon and
drew them through the city streets constituted a mob; the fact that the members of the party intended no serious harm to any one did not absolve the
city from liability. Cherryvale v. Hawman, 8o Kan. i7o (iO9). The authorities are not in accord as to whether the city's responsibility depends upon
the size or formidable character of the mob. County of Allegheny v. Gibson,
9o Pa. 397 (1879); Adarrson v. New York, i88 N. Y. 255 (1907).
TRUSTS-CONsTRucTVE TRus--A son received land from his father by
a deed absolute on its face, in consideration of his paying certain debts of
his father, and upon a promise to reconvey the land on reimbursement for his
advances. Held: The grantee was a constructive trustee of the land for
the grantor. Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 174 S. W. Rep. 727 (Ky. i915).
Where land is conveyed by a deed absolute on its face, with a contemporaneous parol agreement to recovery upon repayment of indebtedness, the
facts present the case of an absolute deed intended as a mortgage. The rule
is generally accepted, both in England and in this country, that parol evidence
is admissible in equity to show a deed to be in fact a mortgage. Whitfield v.
Parfitt, 15 Jur. 852 (Eng. i85i); Alexander v. Grover, 19o Mass. 462 (i9o6).
In some cases it seems to be required that there be fraud or accident in omitting the clause of defeasance. Lincoln v. Wright, 4 De G. & J. 16 (Eng. 1859),
but the general rule now prevailing, in this country at least, is that the agreement of defeasance may be proved aside from any question of fraud or mistake. Miller v. Miller, ioy Md. 6oo (igo5); Cassem v. Heustis, 2o1 Ill. 208
(i9o3); Duell v. Leslie, 207 Mo. 658 (1907).
Neither the "parol evidence
rule" nor the Statute of Frauds is an objection in equity to the admissibility
of such a parol agreement. Campbell v. Dearborn, iog Mass. 130 (1871).
The courts proceed upon the ground that the grantee becomes a constructive
trustee of the land. Owen v. Williams, 13o N. C. 165 (i92) ; Giffen v. Taylor,
139 Ind. 573 (x894).
But a contention that a deed absolute on its face was
intended as a mortgage must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
Rankin v. Rankin, 216 Ill. 132 (1905); Jones v. Rush, 156 Mo. 364 (19oo).
Contra: Donaldson v. Loan Co., 130 Ia. 467 (19o6), where it was held that
an agreement to reconvey land on payment of the grantor's indebtedness
amounted to an express trust, which could not be proved by parol. In Pennsylvania, the Act of June 8, i88i, P. L 84, provides that a deed absolute on
its face shall not be reduced to a mortgage except by a defeasance in writing,
signed, sealed and delivered at the time and recorded within sixty days. In
Oklahoma. it is provided by Sessions Laws 1897, §12, ch. 8, that an absolute
deed intended to be defeasible shall be recorded as a mortgage.
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TRUSTS-OWNERSHIP OF PROCEEDS OF DRFrT-A draft attached to a bill of
lading was delivered by a depositor to the Auburn bank in whose favor it
was drawn and was sent by them to a correspondent bank for collection. The
practice of the Auburn bank was to credit -the depositor at once with the
face value and permit him to. draw on it, the depositor being charged with
interest for the full amount until the returns were received, it being understood that if payment should be refused, the amount of the draft should be
charged back to the depositor. When the deposit was made the depositor
was indebted to the Auburn bank and subsequently overdrew the amount
credited. A creditor of the depositor sought to reach the proceeds in the
hands of the correspondent bank by garnishment. Held: The Auburn bank
can claim proceeds as against the attaching creditor. Scott v. McIntyre Co.,
144 Pac. Rep. ioo2 (Kan. 1914).
It is generally held that on the deposit of paper endorsed "in blank" or
"for deposit", where the amount is immediately credited to the depositor's
account, in the absence of any contrary intention shown, title passes to the
bank. Security Bank v. Northern Fuel Co., s8 Minn. 14r (1894); Morris v.
First Nat. Bank, 2oi Pa. i6o (Igo2) ; and this is so whether or not the custom of "charging back" unpaid drafts exists. Burton v. United States, 196
U. S. 283 (z9o4); Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336 (igo5); although in a
few jurisdictions the latter custom is deemed conclusive evidence of an
agency. Armour Packing Co. v. Davis, 1I8 N. C. 548 (1896). The payment
of interest on amounts drawn on account, Giles v. Perkins, 9 East, 12 (Eng.
i8o7), and a fortioriby payment of interest on full amount of credit given as
in the principal case, being inconsistent with the vesting of title in the bank,
is held to create an agency. St. Louis Ry. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566 (1889).
In the principal case the court in its opinion says: "We regard the result
ar controlled by the circumstances that the depositor not only received credit
for the amount of the draft, but actually drew from it and used the full
amount," and further on, "Whether its [the depositary's] interest amounted
to a full title or to a lien for what it had advanced is not material." So,
while under the facts of the case the decision of the most difficult question
in this class of cases, vir., whether title has or has not passed to the depositary, was found unnecessary, under slightly altered circumstances it might
well have become material. Under the cases cited supra, it is submitted, the
payment of interest would indicate that no title passed but that the depositary
merely acquired a lien on the draft which it held as collateral security for
contingent future loans.

TRUSTS-REVOCATroN-A grantor conveyed certain securities to a trust
company in trust to pay the income to himself and wife for life, and after
his death to pay the principal to those to whom he should direct by will,
and if he should die intestate, to his heirs. He made a will naming the
children of his brother. Subsequently by an instrument he directed payment
to his wife. Held: The grantor could not change his disposition of the property without the consent of the children, since the creator of a trust, without
reserved power of revocation, cannot change the terms of the trust without
the consent of all the beneficiaries. N. J. Trust Co. v. Parker, 93 At. Rep.
196 (N. J. 1915).
It is well established that a completed trust without reservation of power
of revocation can be revoked only by consent of all the cestuis que trustent.
Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721 (191); Gobeille v. Allison, 76 At. Rep.
354 (R. 1. 19ro). If any of the cestuis are not in being, or are not sui juris,
it cannot be revoked at all. Isham v. R. R. Co., ii N. J. Eq. 227 (1856).
When, however, it appears from all the circumstances that undue influence
was exerted upon the settlor or that the omission of a power of revocation
was due to fraud, accident or mistake, or that the settlement would be unreasonable or improvident for lack of a provision for revocation, equity will
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set the settlement aside. Smith v. Boyd, 6i N. J. Eq. i75 (igoo) ; Lawrence
v. Lawrence, i81 Il1. 248 (1899). Further, the absence of a power to revoke
a voluntary settlement or trust is viewed by courts of equity as a circumstance of suspicion, and very slight evidence of mistake on the part of the
settlor will be laid hold of to set aside the deed. Garnsey v. Mundy, 24
N. J. Eq. 243 0873). But when the settlor did not misapprehend the contents of the deed, and there was no fraud or undue influence, and no power
of revocation was reserved, the settlor is bound, though some contingency
was forgotten and unprovided for. Keyes v. Carleton, 141 Mass. 45 (x886).
In Pennsylvania it seems to have been held that a voluntary trust settlement which is testamentary in its nature is revocable by the settlor, although
no power of revocation has been inserted in the settlement. Rich's Appeal,
ro5 Pa. 528 (1884) ; Chestnut St. Bank v. Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 333 (i898). But
later' decisions have restricted the apparent scope of these decisions, and it
seems now to be law in Pennsylvania that power to revoke such a settlement
will not be implied, and if the settlement itself is a valid trust, it is revocable
only in accordance with its express terms. Kraft v. Neuffer, 2o2 Pa. 558
(igo2) ; Fry v. Trust Co., 207 Pa. 64o (p9o4).

